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Abstract
Fire and emergency managers have generally 
been more concerned with undertaking their 
immediate, vital mission than longer term, 
strategic policy development. This paper draws 
on a recent book by the authors to suggest a 
process for developing and implementing robust 
policy for fire and emergency management. 
Different approaches to policy development are 
discussed. The case is made that there are distinct 
types of policy problems in fire and emergency 
management, each requiring distinct approaches. 
The need for thought on policy implementation 
style, the advantages of multiple problem framing 
and the challenge of policy instrument choice  
are set out. 
Introduction
Disasters, even if not large, are often treated to intense 
media coverage with the consequent need for political 
involvement and public sympathy. The media, political 
and local constituencies generally endow special status 
on those who show leadership and empathy with 
the affected, while the less visible process of strategic 
policy development and implementation for disaster 
reduction may carry little political reward. Ironically, 
less visible success in reducing the impacts of events 
that might otherwise have become disasters carries 
the risk of budget cuts and reduced status and profile 
for those involved. This is because media and political 
rewards are, not surprisingly, skewed towards the heroes 
of response, rather than towards behind-the-scenes 
strategic planners. 
This points to the desirability of developing policy that 
serves a number of aims – national and local; social, 
economic and environmental; focused on preparedness, 
response and long-term recovery – and that is flexible 
enough to cope with shifts in community and political 
priorities, while ensuring a high positive media and 
political profile. Such strategic policy is dependent 
upon the suitability of the institutional settings within 
which policy is formulated, developed, implemented 
and monitored, and within which it evolves. Fire and 
emergency management is constrained or enabled by 
these policy and institutional settings. 
Our aim is to provide a framework to help achieve this 
and to widen the focus to include not only the disaster 
event but to encompass longer-term thinking about the 
disaster process, including issues such as vulnerability, 
resilience, preparedness and recovery – and the 
frequently overlooked area of policy. 
‘Policy’ might be one of the most overused and least 
understood words in contemporary governance. Policies 
appear to exist for almost everything, but are rife with 
ambiguity, indifferent support, and implementation 
problems. We are not advocating specific policy 
instruments here, but examine processes for developing 
and implementing robust policy. The paper suggests a 
definition, examines the adaptation of Bridgman and 
Davis’ (2004) Australian policy cycle to fire and emergency 
management, and identifies some fundamental issues and 
pitfalls. To do this it draws on aspects of a recent book 
by the authors (Handmer and Dovers 2007). Note that 
only some aspects of the material set out in the book are 
covered here: defining policy; making policy; aligning 
policy with the problem; strategic implementation style; 
and choosing specific policy instruments. 
Defining policy 
Public policies are positions taken and communicated 
by governments, in more or less detail – they are 
‘avowals of intent’ that recognize a problem and state 
what will be done about it. Policy documents should set 
out the rationale, evidence, approach, responsibilities, 
monitoring and implementation instruments. (Private 
or community organisations also develop, communicate 
and seek to implement policies, however the focus here 
is on public policy). Policy statements would usually be 
preceded by wide public debate – the argument being 
that this brings broad ownership and support for the 
policy easing implementation. 
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Policy programs are specified and substantial 
manifestations of a policy, comprising elements of 
implementation as well as of intent. Beneath this level, 
for an applied policy, there will be specific, practical 
projects. For example, a policy on community flood 
preparedness might include, a program of community-
based flood protection and evacuation plans, and 
within that program a number of discrete projects, 
implementing this program in different locations. 
Making policy
Policies emerge through complex and variable policy 
processes that include both government and non-
government players. Although reflecting the institutions 
of governance in a jurisdiction, policy processes vary 
greatly across issues, sectors and over time. The term 
policy cycle is often used as synonymous with policy 
process, emphasizing the cyclic and reiterative nature 
of policy making. Policy system is a related term, and 
policy sub-systems refers to the fact that, within the 
broader landscape of public policy in a jurisdiction, 
distinct sets of processes and actors exist for specific 
sectors or issues. That is, one can delineate the  
policy sub-system concerned with emergency 
management, as opposed to public health policy  
(but also recognise links).
There are many views on policy and policy making.  
The following are some of the main perspectives (for a 
more detailed discussion, see Howlett and Ramesh 2003). 
Policy making is often seen and discussed as a rational 
evidence-based exercise. This ‘rational-comprehensive’ 
view sees policy making as an exact and well-informed 
problem-solving exercise, where an issue or problem is 
thoroughly investigated, all possible options considered, 
and the optimal policy choice made. It is usually 
unrealistic, as sufficient information is rarely available, 
and political values would normally play some role. 
This ‘rational’ view was challenged by the ‘incremental’ 
view encapsulated in Lindblom’s famous phrase ‘the 
science of muddling through’ (Lindblom 1959, 1979). 
This view argues that policy change occurs in small 
steps, taking possible rather than ideal measures, dealing 
with discrete parts of larger problems. In the context 
of US flood risk management policy, Gilbert White has 
argued that progress was “two steps forward, one step 
back” in the face of political and other difficulties. This 
is realistic in many circumstances, but can be criticized 
as not very strategic. 
Other models include that proposed by Etzioni (1967) 
who suggested a compromise, ‘mixed scanning’, where 
an initial more superficial scoping exercise reduces 
the policy choices, which can then be analysed and 
compared in depth. March and Olsen’s (1979) ‘Garbage 
can model’ may be depressing, but is also perhaps 
realistic where ends and means are mixed in a rush for 
answers to emergent problems or sudden demands. It is 
indicative of a complete lack of policy preparedness. 
The above views represent only four of many different 
ways of thinking about policy and policy making. 
In Australia, the Australian ‘policy cycle’ approach 
has come to dominate as an answer to, and reaction 
against, the linear logic of the rational-comprehensive 
model. It recognizes the iterative and cyclic nature of 
policy processes, and the importance of monitoring and 
review of policies. Rather than staged ‘models’, much 
contemporary policy literature emphasises political 
negotiation and the discursive and contingent nature  
of policy-making (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994; 
Healy 1997; Fischer 2003).
Mr Phil Koperberg former Commissioner of NSW Rural Fire Service with the media at a daily press briefing.
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Despite these recent and well-argued shifts in 
understanding, all four of the linear approaches set out 
above are evident in practice with most, under the right 
circumstances, being valid. 
For the purpose of fire and emergency management 
policy, we suggest a framework informed by elements 
of (i) Bridgman and Davis’ (2004) Australian policy 
cycle and similar models (see Dovers 2005) and (ii) the 
emergency risk management process (EMA 2000), itself 
based on the Australian/New Zealand Risk Management 
Standard (Standards Australia (current version - 2004). 
The framework for emergencies and disasters policy 
and institutional analysis combines an understanding of 
both policy and disasters. It does not say ‘how’ to design 
specific policies and institutions, but rather represents a 
comprehensive and integrated framework and checklist, 
not a prescriptive model or sequence. The lines between 
the elements of the framework recognize that, while 
neither in theory nor in practice strictly a cycle, the 
elements are nonetheless tightly interdependent (Figure 1).
2.  Policy framing 
and strategic 
policy choice
•  Choice of broad policy style/s strategic policy choice 
• Identification of relevant policy principles
• Definition of desired outcomes/policy goals 
• Communication of policy statement/direction 
• Assess other policies and institutional environment
3.  Policy design and 
implementation
• Policy instrument choice 
• Implementation planning 
• Provision of resources (multiple forms) 
• Communication and information strategies 
• Enforcement and compliance provisions 
• Establishment of monitoring and adaptive learning mechanisms
4.  Policy 
monitoring  
and learning
• Ongoing monitoring and routine data capture 
• Structured and adaptive learning from events 
• Rigorous and mandated evaluation 
• Adaptation, cessation, problem redefinition, etc.
Cross-cutting policy 
principles
• Whole-of-government coordination 
• Transparency and accountability 
• Appropriate public participation
Institutional design 
imperatives
• Coordination of actors and organizations 
• Use of legal systems and instruments 
• Clarity or roles and responsibilities 
• Purposefulness and persistence over time 
• Inclusion, especially of the less powerful 
• Information richness and sensitivity 
• Flexibility and adaptability
1. Problem Framing • Social debate and wide ownership of problems 
• Ongoing monitoring, research and development, and inclusive discourse 
• Identification of direct and underlying causes. 
• Identification of vulnerability/resilience, allowing multiple definitions and perceptions 
•  Assessment of uncertainty, including residual uncertainty and risk assessment 
procedures
• Definition of policy and institutional problems, including multiple interpretations
Figure 1. Framework for emergency management policy development 
(Handmer and Dovers 2007)
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The following summarises the framework: 
Problem framing (stage 1). 
Problem framing emphasizes the importance of 
how we arrive at an understanding of policy and 
institutional problems in emergencies and disasters. 
Damaging events or natural phenomena such as 
floods are not policy or institutional problems, but 
they serve to define such problems, along with the 
characteristics of human systems. The approach 
should include the different frames of multiple 
stakeholders, and an open assessment of risk and 
uncertainty (including for example distortion, 
taboos, unknowables and probabilities). How a 
problem is defined will determine ownership of the 
problem, and circumscribe our search for solutions 
and may lead to important issues being ignored, 
for example by focusing on what we know well or 
find easy to measure. Where multiple stakeholders 
are involved they will bring distinctive ways of 
problem framing with them; ignoring this may lead 
to stakeholders failing to understand each other’s 
positions. Some drivers for different ways of framing 
problems include: 
-  Legal requirements and the need to avoid liability 
and legal risk; 
- Disciplinary perspectives or different worldviews; 
-  Political considerations, where disasters create 
political risk, political opportunities to be generous 
to specific groups, or to blame identifiable groups 
or nature (eg climate change); 
-  Economic and commercial opportunities  
and constraints; 
-  Fear, and perceptions that disaster is likely may 
stigmatize an area. 
Policy framing and strategic policy choice (stage 2). 
The policy response can be reactive or proactive, 
involving the choice of general policy styles, based 
on clearly understood principles and aimed at 
achieving agreed and clear objectives; and addressing 
conflicting or minority concerns. Strategic policy 
choice defines the parameters within which policy 
design and implementation occur – that is, what and 
who is included or excluded. 
Policy design and implementation (stage 3). 
Ideally, achieving policy objectives involves the 
choice of specific policy instruments chosen 
transparently from a wide menu of options. To 
implement these instruments, resources are required 
(financial, informational, human, administrative, 
statutory, etc.), and mechanisms for monitoring 
should be put in place to allow evaluation, learning 
and adaptation.
Policy monitoring and learning (stage 4).
Learning from experience demands ongoing 
adaptation and improvement, which requires 
policy monitoring after initial policy design and 
implementation. The link between this and stage 1 
begs the integration of policy and basic monitoring 
to enable separation of the impact of policy 
interventions and other variables. 
Beyond the four stages above, there are a number 
of principles and imperatives that need to be 
accounted for throughout any exercise of policy or 
institutional analysis or design: 
Cross-cutting policy principles. 
The policy process should be informed at all stages 
by: the need to coordinate or integrate activities 
across the sectors and portfolios of government; 
transparency and accountability to improve policy 
formulation and trust; and appropriate and genuine 
forms of public participation. 
Institutional design imperatives. 
All that occurs will be enabled or constrained 
by the institutional system within which policy 
is formulated and implemented. Institutional 
arrangements should allow coordination across 
organizations; reflect agreed principles and directions 
(purpose); balance longevity of efforts (persistence) 
with the ability to adapt (flexibility); and there 
should be effective use of information and wide 
social inclusion. 
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Handmer and Dovers (2007) go into each step in 
considerable detail. Here we simply highlight some  
of the more strategic aspects of the framework. 
Aligning policy with the problem
A well entrenched view appears to be that there is only 
one type of policy problem, and one way of framing 
emergency management policy problems. This approach 
can lead to consideration of only one set of solutions for 
policy problems that vary enormously and that include 
problems that are not amenable to a standard approach. 
Here we suggest some attributes or dimensions of policy 
problems within fire and emergency management, and 
drawing on these attributes set out a typology of such 
problems with their implications for management  
(Table 1). The attributes were developed by an EMA 
funded project, The Science of Surprise, by Handmer 
and Proudley (2005). Each attribute can be thought of 
as a continuum from low to high, small to large, or  
easy to very difficult. Some attributes are: 
• Scale (in space and time)
• Uncertainty (probabilities to ignorance)
• Visibility (low to intense media interest) 
• Problem solving approach (see Table 1)
• Tractability (well practiced, few players to no 
experience, whole of society) 
Drawing on these, we suggest that emergencies can, as a 
usable first approximation, be placed in three categories: 
routine, non-routine, and complex unbounded (Table 1): 
• The attributes of routine emergencies will generally 
be at the lower end of the attribute continuums. 
Responsibility is clear and there is agreement over 
the problem. Risk reduction in the context of 
routine incidents is relatively straightforward as the 
dimensions of the risks are usually well understood 
and solutions are a matter of resources and clear 
trade-offs. Recovery would normally be concerned 
with restoration to the pre-impact state. 
• Non-routine emergencies lie in between routine and 
complex emergencies. Flexibility and adaptability are 
called for in response and prevention, the capacity of 
emergency services is stretched during such events, 
and resources from outside the affected area are 
likely to be needed. But the problems do not pose 
overwhelming challenges to existing emergency 
management policy and practice, or to technological 
capacities. This category could also include policy 
processes or decisions across a suite of routine 
problems, such as establishing a multi-hazard policy 
process or national floodplain management standards. 
• Complex emergencies are characterized by attributes 
at the higher, more difficult end of the continuums. 
Response will need maximum flexibility and 
adaptability, and would have to provide the needed 
leadership to make decisions, harness society’s 
resources and have the capacity to expand critical 
facilities, such as casualty care, identification 
and handling of the dead, and transportation 
and rationing of food supplies. This is especially 
critical: even if there is spare capacity, it may not be 
sufficient to make a difference. The gap in capacity 
will have to be filled by harnessing all of society’s 
resources – government, commercial, civil society 
and international assistance. Recovery planning for 
coordination of resources, rather than command and 
control, is the key as normal response capacity will 
almost always be overwhelmed. Institutional capacity 
Table1: Emergency management typology by attributes.  
(Handmer and Dovers 2007)
Attributes
Scale Uncertainty Visibility Problem solving 
approach 
(Funtowicz and 
Ravetz 1993)
Management 
attributes (eg. 
tractability)
Typology
Routine Modest and well 
defined in space 
and time. Small 
impact
Known and 
quantified
Recognised, but 
low visibility
‘Applied science’ Known, 
anticipated and 
well practiced
Non-routine May be large, but 
defined
Known, but less 
quantified
High visibility ‘Professional 
consultancy’
Medium, some 
planning
Complex Large and/or 
ill-defined in 
space and time 
& may appear 
unbounded. High 
impact. Possibly 
irreversible
Large or 
unknown in 
many dimensions. 
May not be 
quantifiable
Often very high 
profile with 
intense and long 
lasting political 
and media 
interest
‘Post-normal 
science’
Low. Often well 
outside previous 
experience
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for adaptability and for whole-of-government and 
whole-of-society response is needed. Restoration 
is unlikely to be possible. The emphasis will be 
on transformation and seeking advantage from 
opportunities presented by the disaster. 
There could be more categories, but the intermediate 
classes could be difficult to distinguish clearly.  
The classification unintentionally illustrates the issue  
of language – the same term is sometimes used to 
describe an event whether it is ‘routine’ or ‘the largest 
ever’. For example, the term ‘flood’ covers every event 
from a centimetre deep surface flow with nuisance value, 
to an inundation of Biblical proportions which threatens 
a regional economy; similarly with wildfires (although 
there is now an attempt to distinguish very large fires  
as ‘megafires’, eg Williams 2007).
This typology reflects a categorization of policy 
problems by Dovers (2005), and also draws from an 
emergency management interpretation by Tarrant (2006) 
of the three way classification developed by Funtowicz 
and Ravetz (1993). In their own words, Funtowicz and 
Ravetz’s (1993) work places problems where values are 
central, facts are in dispute, stakes and uncertainty are 
high and there is little agreement about what to do, into 
a category that demands a form of understanding and 
knowledge they term ‘post-normal science’ (PNS).  
Their other categories are ‘professional consultancy’, 
applicable to non-routine problems, and ‘applied (or 
normal) science’ applicable to routine problems.  
PNS problems include situations where there is conflict 
over how to approach a risk, or even over how to define 
the risk. Where the physical dimensions of the risk 
are well defined and agreed, the response and event 
management may take the form of a PNS problem, as 
with Hurricane Katrina.
Note that complex emergencies may be so because they 
have emerged after periods of low visibility as conditions 
worsen. (See, for example, the European Environment 
Agency’s report Late Lessons from Early Warnings, 2001). 
Policy implementation styles
Decisions are needed on the policy style or styles to be 
adopted. Here policy style describes the strategic nature 
of policy implementation in jurisdiction, government 
or political systems, ranging from legal or rule-based, 
coercive styles dominated by government, through 
‘corporatist’ traditions where policy is negotiated with 
major interest groups, to a reliance on local communities 
or commerce. Style will vary according to the nature 
and severity of the issues faced, such as in the case 
of a rapidly emerging threat. Routine emergencies 
tend to use rule based approaches, while complex 
problems demand a range of approaches emphasizing 
negotiation. Policy styles also vary by jurisdiction and 
over time as conditions and social values change or as 
administrations change their political persuasions. 
Typically an agency or higher level government authority 
develops policy which requires officials, lower levels of 
government or the public to implement it. The challenge 
is how to achieve implementation (see May and 
Handmer 1992; May et al 1996). In the hazards 
and disaster domain, policy implementation style can  
be classified into three classes:
• Coercion (eg. through regulations, threats of punitive 
measures), and instruments termed in the general 
policy literature as regulatory instruments.  
Coercion comes from mechanisms for monitoring 
the actions of local entities and others required to 
implement the policy, and in the form of penalties  
for failure to comply. Limitations with coercion  
stem from the need for adequate monitoring and 
penalties to force compliance, which often do not 
exist or are very difficult or costly to apply. One 
reason for this difficulty is the potential for a political 
backlash that may threaten the whole policy  
(eg see Handmer 1986); 
• Cooperation (eg. financial incentives, assistance with 
planning, or negotiating tradeoffs to accommodate 
multiple objectives), also known as incentive or 
collaborative instruments. Typically, incentives 
are offered by higher levels of government for 
cooperation by lower levels, in contrast to the 
penalties used in coercive policy design, and may 
comprise money, technical assistance or even 
immunity from legal liability (on this last point, see, 
for example, NSW, 2001, p30). Cash or technical 
advice for retrofitting buildings, making gardens 
more fire resistant or the installation of smoke alarms, 
or the provision of a facilitator to help those at risk 
reach decisions on what to do are typical examples.  
A cooperative approach is inherently flexible. 
• Exhortation such as public education and other 
information provision, otherwise known as moral 
suasion or educative instruments. Most preparedness 
and planning rely on exhortation through awareness-
raising and education programs. The approach has 
two essential logics underpinning it, which suggest 
two forms of communication: 
 –  appeals to the self-interest of a community, 
individual, business or other organization, and/or 
to their sense of community obligation. These tend 
to be motivational, as in the “moral suasion” of 
anti-litter and safe driving campaigns; or
 –  an assumption that there is a knowledge deficit. 
If people have the knowledge provided by an 
awareness campaign, the assumption goes, they 
will do what is thought to be appropriate by 
officials; although this assumption holds in some 
circumstances there is little evidence for its general 
applicability (Sims and Baumann 1983). 
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In practice, a combination is often used. Policy 
programmes utilizing multiple approaches and 
instruments are common, if not always successful, in 
emergency management. Mixed instrument packages fit 
with changes in thinking around policy and regulation 
that generally argue for a more flexible approach 
that includes self-regulation and incentive-based 
policy mechanisms as well as, or in place of, straight 
‘command’ regulation (see Gunningham and Grabosky, 
1999; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). 
Regardless of the policy style there are certain 
prerequisites. If any one of these is absent the policy is 
unlikely to be effective. These can be seen most simply as:
• those responsible for implementation must want 
to do it, that is they must have commitment to the 
policy objectives, and that commitment must be 
matched with a recognized and respected mandate; 
• they must have the ability or capacity to implement the 
objectives, in terms of human, financial, information 
resources, etc, and the organizational capacity; and
• cutting across both these attributes, there should 
 be a process to deal with conflicts between the 
different interest groups, in particular the actual 
and perceived conflicts between the imperatives of 
emergency management, economic development,  
and environmental amenity.
These attributes apply to implementation in many 
areas outside emergency management, which however 
are linked and relevant. For example, private sector 
regulation, intergovernmental relations, and the criminal 
justice system. 
Specific instruments for policy 
implementation
Actual implementation requires specific tools or 
instruments. Policy makers and policy communities 
have at their disposal many instruments, all of which 
will be useful in different situations and combinations. 
And, we can remind ourselves that all instruments are 
forms of information, aimed at changing individual 
or collective behaviours. Whether the ‘message’ is 
a threat, a plea, an incentive or disincentive, or a 
signpost, policy instruments are messages. A massive 
tax impost, crippling fine or a prison sentence are all 
threatening messages, whether considered market or 
legal mechanisms. An educational instrument may be 
subtle and respectful or, as some health programs do, 
use shocking and confronting images. Choosing policy 
instruments is a matter of choosing the most  
appropriate medium for the message in a given 
situation. Viewed like this policy instrument choice 
should contain an objective component, based for 
example on the criteria set out in Table 2. Too often, the 
choice is more a matter of disciplinary and ideological 
argument over, for example, the relative generic merits 
of economic versus legal versus educational instruments. 
These criteria have two uses. The first is to aid analysis 
and discussion of the most suitable policy choice for 
the purpose at hand. They do not make an answer 
necessarily obvious or easy, in fact consideration of 
multiple criteria will complicate the process. But they 
do encourage a more sophisticated, defensible and more 
easily communicated process of choice. The second use 
arises from the observation that ‘perfect’ choices are rare: 
Table 2: Criteria for selecting policy instruments (Handmer and Dovers 2007)
Criteria Question, relative to other instruments
Dependability How certain is it that the instrument will lead to achievement of policy goals?
Timeliness Can the instrument be designed and applied within the necessary time frame?
Cost and efficiency What is the likely gross cost and efficiency of the instrument,  
relative to the stated goals?
Systemic potential Does the instrument address underlying causes, rather than only direct causes and 
symptoms of vulnerability?
Information and monitoring 
requirements
Is the necessary information available to design, implement and monitor the 
performance of the instrument, or can it be feasibly made available?
Distributional impacts Will implementation of the instrument have uneven or inequitable impacts across the 
affected population, and if so can these be managed in an acceptable manner?
Political and institutional feasibility Is proposal and implementation of the instrument feasible in terms of  
(i) political support and (ii) institutional capacity?
Enforcability and avoidability Can implementation/uptake of the instrument be enforced, can it be avoided easily?
Communicability Can the logic, detail and implementation requirements of the instrument be 
communicated to those responsible for implementation or affected by it?
Flexibility Is the instrument capable of being adapted and adjusted in the face of  
changing circumstances?
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a chosen instrument will rarely score highest on  
every criterion, but the process highlights possible 
weaknesses that can be addressed (eg strengthening 
institutional capacity, attending to monitoring needs, 
etc). Table 3 sets out some examples of instruments. 
In addition to the issue of policy style mentioned above, 
instrument choice for fire and emergency management 
may also involve other strategic decisions. Given limited 
resources, should the focus be on short-term measures 
that focus directly on the hazard, such as education 
and flood walls, or to build longer-term community 
resilience through wealth generation and improved 
livelihood security? Concentrating solely on measures 
to alleviate the impacts of specific disasters is unlikely 
to address the avoidable causes of disaster, even though 
many such measures alleviate the symptoms of disaster 
and have high political credibility – and rightly so 
given that they save lives and property. They may also 
sometimes be the only solution, other than emigration. 
Conclusions
The above brief discussion, and the book it is drawn 
from, seeks to provide some ideas for making emergency 
management more effective by improving the policy and 
institutional system EM operates within. But however 
careful, objective and strategic we are, the political 
context should not be forgotten:
 ‘Politics is the essential ingredient for producing 
workable policies, which are more publicly 
accountable and politically justifiable ... While some 
are uncomfortable with the notion that politics can 
enhance rational decision-making, preferring to see 
politics as expediency, it is integral to the process 
of securing defensible outcomes. We are unable to 
combine values, interests and resources in ways 
which are not political.’ Davis et al (1993: 257)
All policy is political – though not necessarily in 
the sense of party politics or expediency - especially 
strategic disaster and emergency policy that addresses 
the distributive issues of the vulnerability and resilience 
of people and communities. 
Given factors such as population increase, wealth, 
trends in settlement patterns and climate change, it is 
inevitable that the future will bring more emergencies 
and disasters, and it seems similarly inevitable that the 
severity of these will increase. The fire and emergency 
management field faces escalating challenges and 
expectations. The rewards for successful policy may 
seem nebulous compared with those from high profile 
operational action, but events of the last few years in 
Australia and overseas highlight the need to develop 
more effective strategic policy processes that address  
the future rather than respond well to the past. 
Table 3: A menu of selected illustrative policy instruments for emergencies and disasters
Class Selected, major instruments Style
Research and monitoring Increase knowledge in a general or specific sense, re 
hazards, vulnerability, success of policy initiatives, community 
awareness, etc.
Exhortation, 
Cooperation
Coercion
Training and education General public education, education targeting sub-sets of 
community; formal curricula in schools, universities; specific 
skill development and training. 
Cooperation,
Exhortation
Intergovernmental agreements Intergovernmental agreements/policies, memoranda of 
understanding, etc between countries or within countries, for 
cooperation, joint response, information sharing, etc.
Cooperative,
Coercion
Legal (i) Statute law: statutes or regulations under existing law to: 
create institutional arrangements; prohibit certain activities; 
zone land and control development;
(ii) Common law: applications of doctrines such as negligence 
or nuisance to prevent or punish, for example, risk-creating 
behaviours.
Coercion
Community participation Community-based risk assessment and management; public 
participation in higher level policy formulation; freedom of 
information laws; community monitoring of hazards;
Cooperation
Market and economic Taxes/charges; use charges; subsidies; rebates; penalties; 
performance; competitive tendering.
Cooperation, 
Coercion, 
Exhortation
Institutional change New or revised institutional system or organizational features, 
to enable implementation of other instruments.
Cooperation, 
Coercion, 
Exhortation
Do nothing Inaction is usually seen as a policy failure, but may be 
justified, after reasoned analysis.
n/a
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